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An outbreak of invasive Mycobacterium 
chimaera infections associated with 
heater-cooler units (HCUs) during car-
diac surgeries was first reported from 
Switzerland in 2015 [1], and the increas-
ing reports of M. chimaera infections fol-
lowing cardiac surgeries using HCUs have 
raised a global public health concern [2, 
3]. More than 250 000 cardiopulmonary 
bypass procedures with HCUs have been 
annually conducted in the United States, 
and thousands of patients exposed to po-
tentially contaminated HCUs have been 
notified [4, 5]. In this issue of Clinical 
Infectious Diseases, Chand et  al [6] de-
scribe patients in the United Kingdom in-
volved in this outbreak; herein we discuss 
issues regarding the acquisition of health-
care-associated M. chimaera as well as in-
fection prevention strategies.
Cardiac surgeries with cardiopulmo-
nary bypass procedures require HCUs with 
water tanks for extracorporeal circulation. 
Although the water used in the circuits 
should not have direct contact with the 
patient’s circulating blood, blood leaks may 
rarely occur (0.003% of all procedures) 
[7]. However, recent outbreak investiga-
tions have demonstrated that HCU water 
tanks contaminated with nontuberculous 
mycobacteria (NTM) can be aerosolized 
and spread via the exhaust vent of HCUs 
to patients and the surrounding environ-
ment [1, 3]. Investigations have identified 
an association between invasive M.  chi-
maera infections and exposure to contam-
inated Stöckert 3T HCUs manufactured 
by LivaNova PLC (formerly Sorin Group 
Deutschland GmbH) [5]. In one study, 
air sampling detected M. chimaera in the 
exhaust air of the HCU as well as in air 
sampling in the area around the operat-
ing table. Cultures were negative when the 
HCU was not operating [8]. Sommerstein 
et  al visualized the airflow pathway from 
the HCU to the surgical area and identi-
fied M. chimaera on sedimentation plates 
at approximately 5  m distance from the 
contaminated HCU in a nonventilated 
environment [9]. Thus, both experimental 
studies demonstrated the airborne trans-
mission mechanism of M. chimaera from 
HCUs [8, 9]. Chand et al also demonstrated 
aerosol diffusion from the rear cooling fan 
of an HCU into the operating area based 
on aerobiological investigation [6].
Mycobacterium chimaera, a slow-grow-
ing NTM, belongs to Mycobacterium 
avium complex (MAC) and has distinct 
clinical characteristics and outcomes. The 
exact identification of M. chimaera within 
MAC requires molecular testing and 
sequencing analysis [10, 11]. NTM are 
ubiquitous in water and soil, and M. chi-
maera has been identified in household 
water [12]. NTM can form biofilm, is rela-
tively resistant to germicides (eg, chlorine), 
and is difficult to eradicate from contami-
nated water systems [13]. Previous reviews 
have described outbreaks and infections 
due to NTM (both rapidly growing and 
slow-growing species) that were associ-
ated with water reservoirs in healthcare 
settings, including tap water, hospital 
water systems, ice and ice machines, bath-
ing and tub immersion, electronic faucets, 
sinks, and showers [13, 14]. Furthermore, 
NTM outbreaks associated with cardiac 
surgeries were mainly caused by rapidly 
growing mycobacteria (eg, M.  fortuitum 
and M. abscessus with water and ice used 
to cool cardioplegia solution; M. wolinskyi 
with a cold-air blaster and a self-contained 
water system in HCU) [15, 16] and, more 
recently, M. chimaera [1, 5, 6, 17].
Chand and colleagues describe an 
excellent outbreak investigation of M. chi-
maera infections in the United Kingdom 
[6]. Overall, they reported 18 probable 
cases of cardiopulmonary bypass–asso-
ciated M.  chimaera infection; patients 
had undergone valve replacement in 
11 hospitals between 2007 and 2015, 
a median of 19  months prior to onset 
(range, 3  months to 5  years). Infections 
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included endocarditis with or without 
aortic root abscess or dissemination in 
11 cases (61%), followed by deep surgical 
site infection and disseminated disease; 9 
patients (50%) died. Importantly, Chand 
et  al provide comprehensive molecular 
epidemiological and aerobiological results 
for M.  chimaera transmission in cardiac 
surgery patients that demonstrated HCUs 
as the water source for this outbreak. The 
increased risk of M.  chimaera infection 
after cardiac surgeries has approached the 
level of MAC infection risk among the 
human immunodeficiency virus–infected 
population in England during 2012–2014 
(1–2 cases/10 000 person-years) [6]. 
The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has estimated the 
risk of infection to be between 1/100 and 
1/1000 patients in hospitals with at least 
one infection identified [2].
Outbreak investigations in other 
countries have produced similar results. 
In 3 European countries (Switzerland, 
Germany, Netherlands), 10 dissemi-
nated M. chimaera cases included pros-
thetic material–associated infections in 
all cases (eg, prosthetic valve endocar-
ditis and vascular graft infection) with 
preceding bacteremic embolization 
and extracardiac manifestation in some 
cases. Despite appropriate antimicrobial 
therapy, M. chimaera infection required 
cardiosurgical reinterventions in 8 of 10 
patients and resulted in poor outcomes 
(4 were fatal) [17]. The clinical manifes-
tations of NTM infections after cardiac 
surgery may be insidious, and notably 
the incubation time was reported to be 
several months to years after the surgery 
(median, 18 months). In addition, clin-
ical symptoms (eg, fever, night sweats, 
and weight loss) and laboratory findings 
(eg, anemia, high lactate dehydroge-
nase serum levels) were nonspecific. Of 
note, patients who had prosthetic valve 
surgeries were more likely to develop 
M. chimaera infections compared to
other procedures requiring cardiopul-
monary bypass [6, 17]. There have also
been multiple reports from the United
States [18, 19]. Four US healthcare
systems reported 24 cases, which 
included prosthetic valve and/or ring 
(46%), vascular graft (29%), left ven-
tricular assist device (21%), heart trans-
plant (13%), and coronary artery bypass 
graft only (4%); 83% were deep-seated 
infections and crude mortality was 46% 
[19]. Minnesota reported 3 dissemi-
nated M.  chimaera cases after cardiac 
surgery that were similar to European 
cases except for ocular involvement and 
the potential misdiagnosis of sarcoidosis 
[18]. The clinical diagnosis of post–car-
diac surgical NTM infections may be 
delayed and underascertained because 
of the prolonged incubation time, non-
specific clinical manifestations, and lack 
of clinical awareness of the possibility of 
NTM infections leading to failure to per-
form appropriate cultures. For example, 
Chand et  al reported substantial delay 
between the first mycobacterial culture 
and presentation (median, 85 days) [6].
In the UK study, contamination with 
NTM and M. chimaera was observed in 
77% and 48% of water samples collected 
from 35 HCUs at 10 hospitals in England, 
respectively [6]. Whole-genome sequenc-
ing (WGS) revealed a high genetic relat-
edness of M. chimaera isolates between 
clinical samples from patients infected 
and air/water samples from HCUs [6]. 
The shared lineage between HCU con-
taminated samples and clinical samples 
from patients in both the United States 
and Europe demonstrated a point-source 
contamination [5, 6, 20]. Mycobacterium 
chimaera obtained from clinical sam-
ples has been linked to environmental 
samples in LivaNova’s production site in 
Germany [20]. Following this linkage, 
the manufacturing process was changed 
in September 2014 [3]. Mycobacterium 
chimaera and other NTM have also been 
isolated from other HCUs [6, 8, 20–22]. 
It appears that in addition to contamina-
tion at the manufacturing site, HCUs can 
be contaminated by NTM via the use of 
potable water to fill their water reservoir, 
although the frequency of such contami-
nation has not been determined [20, 23]. 
There is currently no scientific evidence 
to define a lower threshold of mycobac-
terial contamination in air/water sam-
ples for preventing airborne/waterborne 
infections among patients [24].
Responding to this outbreak has many 
challenges. First, clinical use of HCUs must 
continue despite the risk discussed above 
because cardiac procedures often cannot 
be delayed, the risk of infection remains 
low, and HCUs provide benefits for tem-
perature control during cardiac surgeries 
[2, 6]. Second, HCUs require water reser-
voirs with fans and vents, which allows for 
the aerosolization of pathogens that may 
contaminate the water. Third, cleaning 
and disinfection of HCUs has not been 
adequately validated. HCUs may contain 
dead spaces and lack access to and visual-
ization of internal components. Validated 
protocols for removal of biofilms have 
not been developed. Fourth, whether to 
culture water reservoirs and at what fre-
quency is unclear based on current evi-
dence. The Sorin Group (LivaNova PLC) 
has recommended obtaining periodic cul-
tures of their machines, and the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
recommended considering water sam-
pling if HCU contamination is suspected. 
Validated protocols for obtaining cultures 
(eg, amount of water cultured, methods 
for isolating NTM) have not been devel-
oped. Fifth, the clinical significance of iso-
lating other potential pathogens from the 
HCU water (eg, Legionella, Pseudomonas) 
has not been determined. Furthermore, 
the required quality of water if NTM 
have not been isolated is unclear (eg, 
whether to use drinking water stand-
ards). Finally, there is no evidence that an 
NTM-contaminated HCU can effectively 
be decontaminated. Therefore, contam-
inated HCUs should be returned to the 
manufacturer.
What infection control strategies 
should facilities use to decrease the risk 
of HCU-associated NTM infection? First, 
healthcare facilities should ensure adher-
ence to the most recent version of the 
manufacturers’ instructions for use as well 
as recommendations from the CDC and 
FDA [2, 3]. These include the following: 
(1) evaluate HCUs used at each facility;
(2) review microbiology laboratory data-
bases and cardiac surgical records for
any positive NTM cultures in patients
exposed to an HCU; (3) increase aware-
ness among healthcare personnel of NTM 
infection following cardiac surgeries; and
(4) facilitate risk communication about
potential NTM infections associated with
HCUs with patients (eg, informed con-
sent, patient notification). Education of
clinicians should include when to screen
patients with a history of open heart sur-
gery, heart transplantation, or exposure
of a ventricular assist device and one of
the following conditions for mycobac-
teria: culture-negative endocarditis; cul-
ture-negative or treatment-refractory
sternotomy wound infection, medias-
tinitis or aortic graft infection; fever of
unknown origin; vasculitis; and sarcoido-
sis [25]. Cases were detected via lookback
and provider notification, but not via
patient notification [19]. Second, meticu-
lous maintenance of the HCU with writ-
ten documentations is essential [3]. Third, 
sterile water or filtered water (≤0.22 µm)
as recommended by the manufacturer
must be used to rinse or fill water tanks
[3, 8]. Fourth, the HCU should be located
as far away from the patient as possible. If
possible, the HCU should be located in a
separate room from the operating room.
If in the same room, the vents and fans
of the HCU should face away from the
patient. Fifth, there should be traceability
of HCUs (ie, the specific HCU used on a
specific patient) [25]. Finally, healthcare
facilities that use HCUs should develop
a plan to implement these methods to 
reduce the risk from HCU use.
Healthcare facilities throughout the 
United States are currently considering 
whether to follow the recent CDC rec-
ommendation to notify patients who 
have been exposed to an HCU. There are 
sound reasons for and against notification 
of patients (Table 1). Whether to provide 
enhanced consent for patients who will be 
exposed to an HCU should also be con-
sidered. Education of clinicians as noted 
above should be undertaken by public 
health authorities and individual hospitals.
Further investigations are critically 
needed for improving design of HCUs, 
elucidating the transmission mechanism 
of healthcare-associated pathogens via 
HCUs as a water reservoir and source, 
and establishing effective infection pre-
vention strategies.
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